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In capital cases today, jurors frequently perform two functions: in a single verdict they not only decide the question of guilt but also, where guilt is found, they assess the punishment. In this article, Mr. Handler tackles the troublesome question whether evidence concerning the defendant's background, relevant solely to the issue of aggravation or mitigation of punishment, should be placed before the jury during the trial, thus risking jury utilization of punishment-oriented evidence in resolving the precedent question of guilt. The author analyzes the numerous and often conflicting cases, discusses the California and Pennsylvania statutes which provide for a separate jury trial on the issue of punishment, and then suggests a solution which he believes will encourage the presentation of background evidence and at the same time prevent convictions based upon the "bad man" theory.
With relatively minor exceptions,' the function of the jury in the non-capital criminal case is restricted to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The evidence that the jury receives, in the performance of its duty, is limited in the following manner: the evidence must be relevant to guilt or innocence; and, even though it is relevant and does not violate any other exclusionary rule, it nonetheless may be excluded if its potentiality for prejudice is too great, or if it may cause a confusion of issues or unfair surprise.
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It is the task of the sentencing judge to fix the punishment, and, for obvious reasons, the information that the sentencing judge receives has none of the above limitations. It is usually provided by statute that the judge receive a presentence report, 3 which, if properly prepared, will cover the entire background of the defendant.
The aim of the report is to bring before the judge all of the facts of the life of the defendant pertinent to the purposes of criminal punishment. §9-1819 §9- (Burns 1956 .
2 See McCoRmCK, EVIDENCE ch. 16, 17 (1954) . 4 See State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 183, 142 A.2d 65, 79 (1958) §40-2-3 (1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 53-10 (1958) ; FLA. STAT. § §782. 04, 919.23(1) (2) (1944); GA. CODE AN. §26-1005 AN. §26- (1953 ; HAWAn Rxv. LAWS §291-1, 3, 5 (1955) ; IDAHo CODE §18-4004 (1948) , 1947, c. 91, §121; N. H. REv. LAWS C. 585.4 (1955) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, c. 113, § §2, 4 (1953) ; N. M. STAT. ANN. §40-24-10 (1953) ; N. Y. PENAL LAW § §1045, 1045a LAW § §1045, (1944 ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-17 (1953) responsibility of determining life or death has been shifted to the jury. California and Pennsylvania excepted, 8 in the states where the jury is required to fix the penalty, the jury must determine guilt or innocence and punishment in a single verdict. In view of this additional function, the problem of whether background evidence, relevant solely to punishment, should be presented to the jury in the single-verdict situation has been troubling commentators 9 and courts 0 alike. The experi- L. REv. 521, 530 (1937) . In South Dakota the trial court may disregard a verdict of death and impose life imprisonment, but a jury verdict of life imprisonment is binding. See statute cited note 6 supra.
8 CAL. PENAL CODE §190.01 (Deering 1957 Pocket Supp.): "The guilt or innocence of every person charged with an offense for which the penalty is in the alternative death or imprisonment for life shall first be determined, without a finding as to penalty. If such person has been found guilty of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty.... The determination of the penalty shall be in the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of fact on the evidence presented ..... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (Purdon 1959) : "In the trial of an indictment for murder, the court shall inform the jury that if they find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, it will be their further duty to fix the penalty therefor, after hearing such additional evidence as may be submitted upon that question. Whenever the jury shall agree upon a verdict of murder in the first degree, they shall immediately return and render the same, which shall be recorded, and shall not thereafter be subject to reconsideration by the jury, or any member thereof. After such verdict is recorded and before the jury is permitted to separate, the court shall proceed to receive such additional evidence not previously received in the trial as may be relevant and admissible upon the question of the penalty to be imposed upon the defendant, and shall permit such argument by counsel, and deliver such charge thereon as may be just and proper in the circumstances."
'IE.g., REPORT, ROYAL COMU. ON CAPITAL PUNISH-MENT 194-207 (1953) Atheron,ii held that the circumstances of the crime were relevant to the issue of punishment, and for that reason, should be considered by the jury. After citing the statutory power of the jury to determine punishment, the court said: "In determining between these penalties juries should be, and doubtless are, influenced by the degree of atrocity with which the particular murder has been attended."12 The trial court's instruction was premised on the fact that what was involved was a bald assassination as distinguished from an equal combat. The Supreme Court held that the instruction would be proper if there was evidence to support it; the alternate-penalty statute did not intend that the fair combatant suffer the same penalty as the assassin. Six years later, in People v. Hong Ah Duck, 3 the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence that the accused was presently serving a term of life imprisonment. In affirming the ruling, the court was careful to point out that the evidence was not "offered as affecting in any manner the question of defendant's guilt" and the jury was so instructed. It was offered solely on the question of punishment; its object was to inform the jury that if they fixed the punishment at life imprisonment there would be no addition to defendant's punishment. The court said: "In order to exercise that discretion [on the issue of punishment] in a wise and intelligent manner, the jury should be put in possession of all the facts of the case; and if it be true, as it was in respect to this defendant, that a verdict fixing the punishment at imprisonment for life, would in effect be no punishment at all, we think it was proper to inform the jury, of that fact.'
4
The decisions in Atherton and Hong Ah Duck permitted the introduction of evidence in aggravation of the penalty in the sense that the purpose of such evidence was to influence the jury in favor of the death penalty. When it came time for the defendants to introduce background evidence in mitigation of punishment, the California courts became restrictive. The leading decision is People 2d 343 (1959) with Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. 298, 197 N.E. 214 (1935 App. 609, 219 Pac. 456 (1923) . 10 195 Cal. 623, 234 Pac. 890 (1925) .
20 None of the defendants claimed insanity. On behalf of defendant Montijo, the following evidence was introduced: five psychologists testified as to his mental deficiency; his father related the defendant's life story during which he recalled an injury to the boy's head, his incorrigibility as a youth, reformatory commitment, occasional nervous seizures and mental peculiarities. It was also shown that the defendant was a narcotics user, and there was expert testimony that his intellectual quotient, as gauged by the Binet-Simon test, was no higher than a normal 11 year old. The defense claimed error because the jury was instructed on legal insanity. The court held this not to be erroneous because "the right of the jury.., to consider mental weakness as a mitigating circumstance was not infringed in the slightest degree by anything said in the instructions. In that case the court held that evidence of a long and exceedingly bitter family feud, tending to show mental derangement short of legal insanity, cannot be considered by the jury in mitigation of punishment. The court re-affirmed the rigid approach of the Witt-Troche line. There was a strong dissent which argued that it was a denial of due process to require the jury to fix the penalty in ignorance of any facts which relate to the commission of the crime other than those which show the circumstances connected with the offense.'
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In summing up these decisions, the court, in People v. Barclay, 27 stated the rule in California as follows: evidence of good or bad habits and background is generally inadmissible, but the jury may consider the facts and circumstances of the offense itself. The line between the two is far from clear; this is especially so when the court cites the Perry case in support of the rule restricting the jury to a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the offense itself.
28 When one compares the decision in Hong Ah Duck, which has been followed, 29 allowing the introduction of the fact that the accused is serving a life term, with Witt, Troche, and French, the California rule works unfairly to the defendant. A legislative solution was passed in 1956 providing for two separate trials. The jury is first to consider the question of guilt; if the defendant is found guilty, there is to be a second trial on the question of punishment. At the second trial evidence both in aggravation and mitigation of punishment may be introduced.5
Pennsylvania took a different approach. In mitigation of punishment the defendant was permitted to introduce a wide range of background evidence including mental deficiency short of legal 602 (1932) . The defendant attempted to introduce evidence that "the crime resulted from passion (not generated at the time the crime was committed), rather than from a savage and hoplessly antisocial nature"; that the deceased was an "ill-tempered, faultfinding degenerate, and that, if defendant was not justified in killing... [him] , society was well rid of him." Id. at 153, 160 At. at 608. In addition to the holding stated in the text, the court seemed to imply that this evidence should be excluded because it tended to aggravate rather than mitigate punishment. It would seem, however, that this judgment should be left to defense counsel.
4 See Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 150 A.2d 863 (1959); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 394 Pa. 588, 148 A.2d 234 (1959) .
35 See, e.g., Musmanno, J., dissenting in Commonwealth v. Thompson, cited note 32 supra at 429, 133 A.2d at 231: "Now that this Court has apparantly thrown open the floodgates on all trivial as well as serious offenses of an accused's past, it is possible for an innocent man to be sent to the electric chair not on the evidence of murder but because of the suit of peccadillos which the prosecution forces him to wear. No other state permits so bizarre and tragic a performance. Nothing in history since Justinian, nothing in all the logic of Aristotle, nothing in the mathematics of Euclid, nothing in the science of Newton or Einstein can justify so unAmerican, so unjust, and so unreasonable a procedure." See also Jones, J., dissenting in Commonwealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A. 2d 649, 659 (1949) Commonwealth v. Hardy, 3 Mass. 278, 290 (1807) : "Sewall & Parker, justices, said that they were not prepared to say that testimony of general character should be admitted in behalf of the defendant in all criminal prosecutions; but they were clearly of the opinion that it might be admitted in capital cases, in favor of life." Apparently at this time there was some question as to whether the accused was permitted to introduce evi-[Vol. 51.
but they have failed to articulate and come to grips with the difficulties encountered when embarking on this course of action.
The arguments in favor of the admissibility of background evidence were forcefully stated in the early decisions allowing the evidence. In Fields v. State1 2 the defendant was not permitted to introduce evidence that the deceased was a violent, turbulent, revengeful, blood-thirsty, dangerous man, reckless of human life, and had previously attacked and publicly abused the defendant. After discussing the function of the jury at common law, the Supreme Court said:
"The common law, on this subject, has been greatly changed by our statutes, and the duties and responsibilities of juries largely increased; consequently, evidence that would have been irrelevant and impertinent at the common law, becomes proper and necessary, under our statutes, to enable juries to discharge their newly imp9sed duties rightly and properly.... Although the violence and outrage committed about the person of the defendant in this case might not have been sufficient to reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter, yet, we hold it was clearly proper for the-consideration of the jury in determining the turpitude of the punishment to be inflicted."4 ' In Fletder v. PeopleM a dispute arose concerning the grazing of cattle in a particular area. One Steinbourne, an employee of the deceased, testified that one of the defendants, Merritt Fletcher, shot and wounded Steinbourne and shot and killed the deceased. Subsequent to the trial the parties discovered an affidavit made by Steinbourne prior to the trial stating that Merritt did not shoot dence of good character. See 1 WiGmoRE, EvmuscE §56 (3d ed. 1940).
In Texas, by statute, it is provided that in all prosecutions for felonious homicide "the State or the defendant shall be permitted to offer testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and the previous relationship existing between the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the homicide, which may be considered by the jury in determining the punishment to be assessed." Thx. PEN. CoDe ANN. art. 1257a (Vernon 1936 In Nowarcryk 'v. PeoplM the defendant was not permitted to introduce evidence of prior ill feeling between the defendant and the father of the deceased, and that on the day before the homicide the father, armed with a knife, went searching for the defendant with the expressed intention of killing him. In holding error, the court said:
"The evident design of the [alternate-penalty] statute is that the punishment shall be proportioned to the turpitude of the offense, and it follows that evidence having a direct and legitimate bearing upon that question should be given to the jury, so as to enable them to fix the punishment understandingly and justly....
[ The idea expressed in the three cases was that the alternate-penalty statutes for murder imposed an additional duty on the jury; in order for the jury to satisfy understandingly and justly that obligation, it was necessary that it receive evidence relevant to that question. The later decisions, while their expression is somewhat broader, contain the same idea. "[Tihe purpose... is that they [the jury] should be able intelligently to fix the penalty, and, to that end, that they ought to know what manner of man it is upon whom they are being asked to impose sentence,-his criminal proclivities, his demonstrated attitude toward law and order, and, on the other hand, such mitigating factors as may exist in the nature of impaired health, mental deficiencies, state of intoxication, or other circumstances." 48 The analogy is often made to the role of the sentencing judge in the non-capital case, where it is usually required that he receive a pre-sentence report. Justice Francis, arguing for the admissibility of evidence of mental disorder short of legal insanity, drew the analogy in the following manner:
" v. Henryw° the court held that it was error not to permit the defense to introduce evidence that the accused's mother died when the defendant was four years old and that an aunt had taken care of her until she was fourteen; that the child ran away from home because her father was cruel to her; that she married at an early age and subsequently lived as a lewd woman; in short, that she was a child of misfortune and a victim of circumstances. In State v. Owen 5 ' the offer of proof was that the defendant's mother was a full-blooded American Indian; she died when the defendant was six years old and he had no real home life in the ordinary meaning of the term; he lived from time to time with his sister and other relatives; he had to provide for himself since the age of fourteen; he learned the foundary moulding trade and was so occupied until two weeks before the homicide. In State v. Mount 5 2 the defense offered to show that the accused was five years old when his father entered the army; that his mother then took up with a paramour and lived in open adultery; that at one time he was placed in an orphanage; when he was sixteen he was sent to live with his father who was then living with another woman and that the father was "'a man of loose morals, who flaunted his immorality in the presence of the boy.'"
Other offers have been more limited in scope. Courts have held that evidence may be introduced showing mental deficiency short of legal insanity,n intoxication,M war records, 5 prior ill feeling between the accused and the deceased, 56 and circumstances aggravating to the defendant such as statements of the deceased reflecting upon the chastity of the defendant's daughter, 7 and that the deceased was sexually abusing his wife, the sister of the accused. 5 In other situations courts have indicated that age 59 and drug addiction" were proper considerations on the issue of punishment. In aggravation of punishment, the state has been permitted to show the circumstances of the crime even though a plea of guilty has been entered," bad character, 2 past criminal convictions, and prison status at the time of the offense.3 Three principal arguments have been advanced against the introduction of background evidence: (1) the evidence is irrelevant to the case because the issue is guilt or innocence;" (2) there are no limits to this type of evidence-it will submerge the trial in myriad collateral issues; (3) contrary to the intentions of its adherents, adoption of the rule admitting background evidence will result in the introduction of evidence extremely prejudicial to the defendant on the issue of guilt.
The first argument is plainly spurious. It is quite dear that in a great many murder trials the only issue is punishment. This will arise when the jury is required to fix the penalty on a guilty plea.
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It also occurs quite frequently in states where the court may refuse, or is required to refuse to accept a guilty plea; 6 G the trial then proceeds formally daughter, was provocation, while not sufficient to justify the homicide, at least sufficient basis for holding the imposition by the jury of the death penalty an abuse of discretion. 1110 (1932) ("The right to a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence may be waived by a plea of guilt, which leaves only the question of punishment to be decided by the jury."). In New Hampshire, it is optional with the court. See N. H. Ray. LAws c. 585.5 (1955) . 6 0 Required to refuse plea: See, e.g., HAwAII REv. LAWS §291-4 (1955) ("A plea of guilty to a charge of murder in the first degree shall not be received and if such plea is offered it shall be disregarded by the court, and a jury shall determine the guilt or innocence of and the defendant waits for his opportunity to admit his guilt and plead for mercy. 67 And even in the situation where guilt is at issue, punishment is not only relevant, but perhaps even uppermost in the defendant's mind. In this situation, the choice of whether to plead for mercy, with the possibility of compromising the accused's case on guilt, is a decision that ought to be made by defense counsel. It should not be decided beforehand by a rule of law.
The second argument is more serious. It is based on the fear that the trial will be distracted by the various details of the accused's life. It is analogous to the policy reasons behind the rule that character be evidenced by reputation rather than specific instances of conduct.
68 A typical statement of the argument for disallowing background evidence on this ground runs as follows: "Were the rule otherwise, it is quite evident that first-degree murder trials might well become hopelessly mired in autobiographical sketches and psychosociological debates, submerging the true issue of guilt or innocence." 6 9 As stated above, background evidence has ranged over a broad area. §1.130 (1948) ; N. J. STAT. AvN. tit. 2A, c. 113, § §2, 4 (1953) State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 106, 115 A.2d 62, 87 (1955) .
This standard has sufficient vagueness to insure that we will be plagued with the problem for some time to come.
"When the issue is life or death, the scope of relevant proof is assuredly broad. Does the standard of reasonable bounds import the notion that some evidence, although relevant and not unduly cumulative, can nevertheless be excluded in the discretion of the trial court? If not, then the reasonable bounds referred to are as broad as the issue to which the proofs are addressed." 70 The problem of limiting the scope of background evidence does not appear to be difficult in cases like Fields, Fletcher, and Nowarcryk since the relevancy would be defined by the purpose of proving the turbulent character of the deceased and the circumstances surrounding the homicide. In cases where the object is to prove intoxication, drug addiction, or perhaps mental deficiency short of legal insanity, 7 ' the scope of the relevancy, while somewhat broader, also appears to have limits.
In cases like Henry, Owen, and Mount, however, the purpose was to show anything in the general background of the accused that might strike a sympathetic response on the part of the jury. In this type of case, even though the permissible range of inquiry on the issue of punishment is necessarily broad, the court will have to draw the line at the point where the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the cost of undue consumption of time or the threat of confusion of issues, prejudice, or surprise.
7 2 This is the balancing and line-drawing approach used when the courts 70 Cited note 10 supra at 223, 152 A. 2d at 357 (concurring opinion). Despite the opinion of the draftsman of the California statute that the scope of the admissible evidence under that statute is as broad as the presentence and probation reports, letter to'author from Hon. Roy A. Gustafson, District Attorney, Ventura County, California, dated April 7, 1960 , the courts of that state have considerably narrowed the scope of the evidence. See People v. Moya,-Cal. 2d-,350P.2d 112, 3 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1960); People v. Baldonado, -Cal. 2d -, 350 P. 2d 112, 3 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960); People v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871, 346 P.2d 22 (1959) , discussed in note 72 infra. Compare also People v. Love, -Cal. 2d-, 350 P.2d 705, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960) , discussed in text at note 75 infra. The Pennsylvania courts will be faced with the same problem since their statutory language provides no guides as to the scope of the admissible evidence at the second hearing. See statute cited note 8 supra. 
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Similarly, evidence introduced on the issue of punishment may be inflammatory. Even though the jury, on this question, has wide discretionary powers, the determination of the issue of penalty must be a rational one. The probative value of the evidence must be weighed against its inflammatory effect, and it must be excluded if it serves primarily to inflame the passions of the jury without furthering the purposes of criminal punishment, or, even if relevant to the purposes of punishment, it must still be excluded if it can be presented effectively in a non or less inflammatory manner. In a recent California case, 7 " evidence was introduced at the second hearing for the sole purpose of showing that the victim died in unusual pain. This was held to be prejudicial error on the ground that there was no claim that the pain was intentionally inflicted, and pain unintentionally inflicted is relevant only to the extent that retribution for the evil done by the criminal is a primary objective of the criminal law, a doubtful proposition in California. Furthermore, reasoned the court, even if pain was relevant, it was testified to by a doctor, and there was no need to employ the dramatic techniques involved-a photograph showing not the wound, but the expression of the face in death, and a tape recording of the failing voice and groans of the dying victim.
The third argument focuses its attention on the situation where the defendant has a prior criminal record and draws its support from the Pennsylvania experience. If the jury is to know "what manner of man it is upon whom they are being asked to impose sentence," 76 then the jury must have before it the complete background of the accused. This is the function of the pre-sentence report in the non-capital case. The reports not only cover the early environment, religious training, schooling, work record and the like, but also the criminal history of the accused including arrests, indictments, convictions, and conduct in prison. 7 7 The jury in the capital case performs -the same function as the sentencing judge in the noncapital case; therefore the jury should have the same background information. "Surely it cannot be suggested that the truth in relation to the results of medical and probationary examinations while in prison.
5 People v. Love, -Cal. 2d-, 350 P.2d 705, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960) .
76 Commonwealth v. Simmons, cited note 31 supra at 401, 65 A.2d at 358.
7 Francis, J., quoted in text at note 49 supra.
question of punishment travels a one-way street." 7 8
The logic of this argument is unassailable, and indeed, this is apparently the position of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 79 and was thought to be the position of the legislative solution in California." Under this approach the Pennsylvania courts had in effect wiped out the rule which disallows the state to introduce initially any kind of evidence of bad character."' Evidence of bad character, including not only prior convictions, but also evidence of reputation,n is excluded not because it lacks relevancy; to the contrary, it proves too much."[Tlhere is no doubt that conduct is relevant to character. An assault is relevant to indicate a violent character; a fraud is relevant to indicate a dishonest character."" It is because of the danger of destructive prejudice that the exclusionary rule applies." "The deep tendency of human nature to punish not because our victim is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught, is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court. 
